Category: Perspectives on Science seminar

At the next Perspectives on Science seminar on Monday 18.10., Michiru Nagatsu (University of Helsinki) will give a presentation titled “Behavioral economics for sustainability? A critical review”. The seminar takes place in Zoom from 14:15 to 15:45.

Perspectives on Science is a weekly research seminar which brings together experts from science studies and philosophy of science. It is organized by TINT – Centre for Philosophy of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. More information about the seminar here.

To join the seminar, please sign up here.

Abstract:

It is now widely accepted that behavioral economics is not one of so-called heterodox schools of thought anymore, but a part of mainstream economics with nontrivial impact on policy: ‘we are all behavioral economists now’, as Angner (2019) provocatively declares. Experimental anomalies such as the framing effect and preference reversals shock the axiomatic foundations of economic theory some fifty years ago, but a new academic equilibrium has now been established around the idea of new behavioral synthesis: psychology understood as cognitive and affective mechanisms that make people’s behavior deviate from the models of rational choice can be fruitfully integrated into the economic analysis of individual and interactive decision making by pragmatically and flexibly modifying assumptions, up to a point. Although the minority still complain that this approach is a ‘neoclassical economics in disguise’ (e.g. Berg and Gigerenzer 2010), the main focus has shifted largely from the empirical questions of whether some assumptions of choice models need to be modified or abandoned, to normative implications of stylized behavioral anomalies (e.g. Sugden 2018).

In contrast to the ascent of behavioral economics, ecological economics, which emerged around the same time (Boulding 1966; Spash 2013), remains strikingly heterodox, despite the prominence of the sciences on which it is based (e.g. Rockström et al. 2009). In this talk, instead of directly exploring reasons for the contrasting trajectories of the two schools, I start from another type of questions arising as a side-effect of this contrast: How can behavioral economics—which has been more ‘successful’ in a way than ecological economics so far—help us solve the ongoing ecological crises? I provide a preliminary review of a range of approaches, such as (1) nudge and boost for pro-environmental behavioral change; (2) improve neoclassical environmental economics by behavioral insights; to (3) argue for economic policy change (e.g., abandoning GDP as an indicator to guide policy) based on behavioral insights. I argue that none of them, independently or jointly, guide us in systematically and sufficiently resolving the cur- rent crises, which makes it urgent for methodologists to tackle the original question: Why are we not all ecological economists yet? Is there something fundamentally wrong with economic thinking?

Author bio:

Michiru Nagatsu is an associate professor in Practical Philosophy (Faculty of Social Sciences) and Methodologies for Inter- and Transdisciplinary Sustainability Science (Helsinki Institute of Sustainability Science). His work includes philosophy of emotion, experimental philosophy of science, as well as philosophy of economics.

At the next Perspectives on Science seminar on Monday 11.10., Diane Coyle (University of Cambridge) will give a talk on her upcoming book “Cogs and Monsters: What Economics Is, and What It Should Be”. The seminar takes place in Zoom from 14:15 to 15:45.

Perspectives on Science is a weekly research seminar which brings together experts from science studies and philosophy of science. It is organized by TINT – Centre for Philosophy of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. More information about the seminar here.

To join the seminar, please sign up here.

Abstract:

Digital technology, big data, big tech, machine learning, and AI are revolutionizing both the tools of economics and the phenomena it seeks to measure, understand, and shape. In Cogs and Monsters, Diane Coyle explores the enormous problems—but also opportunities—facing economics today if it is to respond effectively to these dizzying changes and help policymakers solve the world’s crises, from pandemic recovery and inequality to slow growth and the climate emergency.

Mainstream economics, Coyle says, still assumes people are “cogs”—self-interested, calculating, independent agents interacting in defined contexts. But the digital economy is much more characterized by “monsters”—untethered, snowballing, and socially influenced unknowns. What is worse, by treating people as cogs, economics is creating its own monsters, leaving itself without the tools to understand the new problems it faces. In response, Coyle asks whether economic individualism is still valid in the digital economy, whether we need to measure growth and progress in new ways, and whether economics can ever be objective, since it influences what it analyzes. Just as important, the discipline needs to correct its striking lack of diversity and inclusion if it is to be able to offer new solutions to new problems.

Author bio:

Professor Diane Coyle is the Bennett Professor of Public Policy at the University of Cambridge. Diane co-directs the Bennett Institute where she heads research under the themes of progress and productivity. Her new book ‘Cogs and Monsters’ looks at how economics needs to change, while her previous book, ‘Markets, State and People – Economics for Public Policy’ examines how societies reach decisions about the use and allocation of economic resources.

Diane is also a Director of the Productivity Institute, a Fellow of the Office for National Statistics, an expert adviser to the National Infrastructure Commission, and Senior Independent Member of the ESRC Council. She has served in public service roles including as Vice Chair of the BBC Trust, member of the Competition Commission, of the Migration Advisory Committee and of the Natural Capital Committee. Diane was Professor of Economics at the University of Manchester until March 2018 and was awarded a CBE for her contribution to the public understanding of economics in the 2018 New Year Honours.

Her books include GDP: A Brief but Affectionate History, The Economics of Enough, The Soulful Science, and The Weightless World. Her recent papers have been published by Science, Review of International Political Economy, Nature, Antitrust Law Journal, and Regional Studies.

At the next Perspectives on Science seminar on Monday 4.10., Lucie White (Leibniz University Hannover) will give a presentation titled “Is Vaccine Refusal Free Riding?”. The seminar takes place in Zoom from 14:15 to 15:45.

Perspectives on Science is a weekly research seminar which brings together experts from science studies and philosophy of science. It is organized by TINT – Centre for Philosophy of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. More information about the seminar here.

To join the seminar, please sign up here.

Abstract:

How we should deal with the problem of COVID-19 vaccine refusal is contingent on whether vaccine refusal is a “free rider” problem. Based on a recent article suggesting that vaccine refusers should not be regarded as classic free riders, I will delve into the connections between vaccine refusal and free riding. I will suggest that vaccine refusers are like free riders in one important sense – they are refusing to contribute to something (herd immunity) that they are benefitting from. But vaccine refusers are arguably not like free riders in that they do not agree that COVID-19 herd immunity is a public good, and that their being vaccinated would be a reasonable contribution towards this good. It might thus be difficult to incentivize vaccination in the way that we might try to incentivize classic free riders to contribute to a public good. Taken together, these arguments constitute a tentative case for vaccine mandates. But in order to determine whether, and under what circumstances, vaccine mandates might be appropriate and effective policy, we must also distinguish between “anti-vaxxers” and the “vaccine hesitant”.

Author bio:

Lucie is a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute of Philosophy, Leibniz University Hannover. She’ll be taking up an assistant professorship at the University of Utrecht in November. She mainly focuses on bioethics, broadly conceived, and at the moment, she’s working on a couple of projects related to COVID-19 and public policy.

At the next Perspectives on Science seminar on Monday 27.9., Magdalena Malecka (University of Helsinki) will give a presentation titled “Towards a Critical Philosophy of Science Perspective on the Behavioural Public Policy”. The seminar takes place in Zoom from 13 to 15 pm.

Perspectives on Science is a weekly research seminar which brings together experts from science studies and philosophy of science. It is organized by TINT – Centre for Philosophy of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. More information about the seminar here.

To join the seminar, please sign up here.

Abstract:

During the talk I would like to summarize the main results of my Marie Skłodowska-Curie project which aimed at understanding how the behavioural sciences and policymaking are entangled with each other in the recent shift in public policymaking, called behavioural public policy, or the behavioral turn in policy. I argue that in the existing discussions on behavioural policy it has not been noticed so far that there is a gap between the way in which behavioural science is represented in the practices and discourses of policymaking and the knowledge that it actually provides. In order to expose this gap, I bring insights from the philosophy of science (in particular, from feminist philosophers of science) and from history of behavioural science (in particular, the history of the US behavioural research during the Cold War). I point out that the discourse of the behavioural policy, but also the debates surrounding it, including critical voices, presume a set of claims about the behavioural sciences. There seems to be a shared understanding of what the behavioural sciences offer us knowledge of. It is widely believed that behavioural research reveals irrationality of human behaviour, that it offers ‘descriptive’ and ‘realistic’ views on decision-making, that it uncovers behavioural tendencies and biases which are systematic and robust, and that it identifies cognitive causes of behavioural changes. I challenge this set of widely shared beliefs. After questioning the epistemic presumption underlying behavioural approach to policy, I reflect on what my argument means for the existing discussion. I believe, and hope, that once we have a proper understanding of what we can and cannot know on the basis of behavioural science, then new critical perspectives on the role of behavioural science in policy will open up. I end my talk by speculating about such perspectives and I present new directions I envision for my further research on this topic.

Author bio:

Magdalena Małecka is a Principal Investigator of the three-year research project in philosophy of economics at the University of Helsinki and an Assistant Professor at Aarhus University (Aarhus Institute of Advanced Studies). After defending her PhD at the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw she has undertaken research at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, Stanford University, Columbia University, New School for Social Research, Central European University, and European University Institute in Florence. Magdalena’s research is driven by an attempt to understand how scientific knowledge is interwoven with social, legal and political practices. She has published in the philosophy of the social and behavioural sciences, philosophy of economics, and philosophy of law.

At the next Perspectives on Science seminar on Monday 20.9., David J. Hand (Imperial College London) will give a presentation titled “Seeing through data – rewards and risks in modern data science”. The seminar takes place in Zoom from 2 to 4 pm.

Perspectives on Science is a weekly research seminar which brings together experts from science studies and philosophy of science. It is organized by TINT – Centre for Philosophy of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. More information about the seminar here.

To join the seminar, please sign up here.

Abstract:

Modern data science has the potential to provide technology which will revolutionise the human condition, but all advanced technologies come with risks, and data technologies are no exception. I examine the potential and risks, looking at the challenges of new sources of data and new data analytic tools, and how to overcome these challenges. Contrary to popular opinion, the increasing use of very large data sets and machine learning and artificial intelligence algorithms means that it is more important than ever to think carefully about problems and how to solve them.

Author bio:

David J. Hand is Emeritus Professor of Mathematics and a Senior Research Investigator at Imperial College, London, where he previously chaired the Statistics Section. He is a Fellow of the British Academy and a former President of the Royal Statistical Society. He has received the Guy Medal of the Royal Statistical Society, the Box Medal from the European Network for Business and Industrial Statistics, and the International Research Medal of the IFCS. His books include Principles of Data Mining, Measurement Theory and Practice, The Improbability Principle, The Wellbeing of Nations, and Dark Data: Why What You Don’t Know Matters.

At the next Perspectives on Science seminar on Monday 13.9., Nils Köbis (Max Planck Institute for Human Development | Center for Humans & Machines) will give a presentation titled “How AI influences human ethical behavior”. The seminar takes place in Zoom from 2 to 4 pm.

Perspectives on Science is a weekly research seminar which brings together experts from science studies and philosophy of science. It is organized by TINT – Centre for Philosophy of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. More information about the seminar here.

To join the seminar, please sign up here.

Abstract:

As machines powered by artificial intelligence (AI) influence humans’ behaviour in ways that are both like and unlike the ways humans influence each other, worry emerges about the corrupting power of AI agents. To estimate the empirical validity of these fears, we review the available evidence from behavioural science, human–computer interaction and AI research. We propose four main social roles through which both humans and machines can influence ethical behaviour. These are: role model, advisor, partner and delegate. When AI agents become influencers (role models or advisors), their corrupting power may not exceed the corrupting power of humans (yet). However, AI agents acting as enablers of unethical behaviour (partners or delegates) have many characteristics that may let people reap unethical benefits while feeling good about themselves, a potentially perilous interaction. On the basis of these insights, we outline a research agenda to gain behavioural insights for better AI oversight.

Author bio:

Nils Köbis is a research scientist at the Center for Humans and Machines, Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin. In his work, he uses behavioral science methods to study corruption, (un-)ethical behavior, social norms, and, more recently, artificial intelligence. He is the co-founder of the Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Network and, together with Matthew Stephenson (Harvard Law School) and Christopher Starke (University of Amsterdam), co-hosts KickBack – The Global AntiCorruption Podcast.

At the next Perspectives on Science seminar on Monday 6.9., Carlo Martini (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University) will give a presentation titled “An empirical, hands-on approach to the demarcation problem: studying science disinformation with experiments”. The seminar takes place in Zoom from 2 to 4 pm.

Perspectives on Science is a weekly research seminar which brings together experts from science studies and philosophy of science. It is organized by TINT – Centre for Philosophy of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. More information about the seminar here.

To join the seminar, please sign up here.

Abstract:

The problem of demarcation has long been treated as a theoretical problem related to the logic or methodology of science. In this presentation I argue that the problem of demarcation ought to be treated as an empirical and practical issue relating to science and its methods of seeking the truth. With that move, we can connect very tightly the problem of demarcation with the problem of scientific disinformation. The second part of the presentation will focus on disinformation and how to tackle it in ecological contexts. Several types of interventions have been proposed to prevent the proliferation of false information online, where most of the spreading takes place. A recently proposed but not yet tested strategy to help online users recognise false content is to follow the techniques of professional fact checkers, such as looking for information on other websites (lateral reading) and looking beyond the first results suggested by search engines (click restraint).

In two preregistered online experiments (N = 5387), we simulated a social-media environment and set-out two interventions, one in the form of a pop-up meant to induce participants to follow such techniques, the other based on monetary incentive. In Experiment 1, we compared these interventions to a control condition. In Experiment 2 another condition was added to test the joint impact of the pop-up and the monetary incentive. We measured participants’ ability to identify whether presented scientific information was scientifically (in)valid.

Results revealed that while monetary incentives were overall more effective in increasing accuracy, the pop-up also contributed when the post originated from an unknown source (and participants could rely less on prior information). Additional analysis on participants’ search style based on both self-report responses and objectively measured behaviour revealed that the pop-up increased the use of fact-checking strategies, and that these in turn increased accuracy. Study 2 also clarified that the pop-up and the incentive did not interfere with each other, but rather acted complementarily, suggesting that attention and literacy interventions can be designed in synergy.

Author bio:

Carlo Martini is Associate Professor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Philosophy at Vita-Salute San Raffaele University (UniSR). His primary research interests are in philosophy of the social sciences and social epistemology. He works on the role of expertise in knowledge transfer from science to policy, on scientific disinformation and public trust in scientific experts. After completing his Ph.D. in Philosophy and Economics at the Tilburg Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, he held various positions at the University of Bayreuth and the University of Helsinki. While at the University of Helsinki, he was awarded a Finnish Cultural Academy grant to study the transfer of knowledge from science to policy makers, through expertise and argumentation. He is currently leader of the work package Behavioral Tools for Building Trust in the H2020 Project Peritia (Policy Expertise and Trust), and work package leader in the project From Models to Decisions, funded with a PRIN grant by the Italian Ministry for University, Education and Research (MIUR).

At the next Perspectives on Science seminar on Monday 7.6., Erik Angner (Stockholm University) will give a presentation titled “Nudging and the Problem of Knowledge”. The seminar takes place in Zoom from 2 to 4 pm.

Perspectives on Science is a weekly research seminar which brings together experts from science studies and philosophy of science. It is organized by TINT – Centre for Philosophy of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. More information about the seminar here.

To join the seminar, please sign up here.

Abstract:

One common argument against nudging and other behavioral interventions goes like this: (1) The amount of information relevant to developing successful nudges is vast. (2) If we had access to all that information, we would be able to develop successful nudges. (3) But we don’t have access to all that information. So (4) we cannot develop successful nudges. The fundamental problem is often referred to as “the knowledge problem.” The general argument form has a venerable history, reminiscent of figures like F. A. Hayek and Adam Smith. Constructed in this way, however, the argument seems obviously misconceived: it is straightforwardly interpreted as an instance of denying the antecedent – a fallacious argument form. The purpose of this paper is to explore various ways of articulating the argument in more compelling ways, and also to assess it. In all, I find, the knowledge problem is best understood as a practical problem for choice architects and behavioral-interventions teams – not as an insurmountable obstacle.

Author bio:

Erik Angner is Professor of Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University. As a result of serious mission creep, he holds two PhDs – one in Economics and one in History and Philosophy of Science – both from the University of Pittsburgh. He is the author of two books, Hayek and Natural Law and A Course in Behavioral Economics (3rd ed., 2021), as well as multiple journal articles and book chapters on behavioral and experimental economics; the economics of happiness; and the history, philosophy, and methodology of contemporary economics.

At the next Perspectives on Science seminar on Monday 24.5., Bruno Verbeek (Leiden University) will give a presentation titled “Instrumentalism vs. Isolationism, on the appropriateness of special principles of taxation”. The seminar is organised as a joint seminar with the Moral & Political Philosophy Research Seminar series. The seminar takes place in Zoom from 2 to 4 pm.

Perspectives on Science is a weekly research seminar which brings together experts from science studies and philosophy of science. It is organized by TINT – Centre for Philosophy of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. More information about the seminar here.

To join the seminar, please sign up here.

Abstract:

Is there justice in taxation?

When reading contemporary theories of distributive justice one easily gets the impression that institutional design is merely instrumentally relevant for the implementation of the favored conception of justice. This is especially the case when thinking about the tax regime. For example, Liam Murphy and Tom Nagel in The Myth of Ownership argue that the moral evaluation of a tax regime boils down to assessing whether it is effective and efficient in realizing the preferred overall pattern of distribution. As a result, they claim that there are no special, domain-specific, normative principles for taxation.

In this paper, I discuss four arguments for this negative conclusion and show that these are inconclusive. I also suggest some reasons to believe that the question whether the tax system is just is not exhausted by determining its contribution to a just distribution of burdens and benefits.

Author bio:

Bruno Verbeek is university lecturer at the Institute of Philosophy at Leiden University (Netherlands) since 2003. In 2012 he founded the Centre for Political Philosophy and currently serves as its director. He has published on game-theoretic analyses of social norms, as well as on rational choice accounts of commitment. Currently, he is working on the idea of authority. In addition he has a strong interest in matters of applied economic distributive justice, especially, in the area of taxation.

At the next Perspectives on Science seminar on Monday 17.5., Carla Bagnoli (University of Modena & Reggio Emilia) will give a presentation titled “The Objective Stance and the Boundary Problem”. The seminar is organised as a joint seminar with the Moral & Political Philosophy Research Seminar series. The seminar takes place in Zoom from 2 to 4 pm.

Perspectives on Science is a weekly research seminar which brings together experts from science studies and philosophy of science. It is organized by TINT – Centre for Philosophy of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. More information about the seminar here.

To join the seminar, please sign up here.

Abstract:

This paper investigates some unexplored ambivalences of Strawson’s distinction between the participant stance marked by reactive attitudes, and the objective stance in which such attitudes are deemed inappropriate. First, it is introduced a distinction between recipient-oriented and agent-oriented reasons for taking the objective stance, which are both practical reasons rooted in the agent’s position. The former category of reasons refers to the recipient’s capacities for moral agency, and the latter to the agent’s interests and concerns. Second, it is shown that taking the objective stance for recipient-oriented reasons (i) is a moral move, which alters one’s normative relation to others; and (ii) it may have severe disempowering effects on others. Third, departing from current debates, this investigation refocuses on cases in which the objective stance is grounded on self-defensive or adversarial reasons. The examination of such cases shows that the objective/participant divide stands behind and organizes the complex dynamics through which moral membership is negotiated. Once agent-oriented reasons are brought into focus, it appears that the divide is contestable and renegotiable: the boundaries of the relevant community can be altered by claiming and reclaiming responsibility. Correspondingly, reactive attitudes should be acknowledged as means and drives of the struggle for moral and political recognition. 

Author bio:

Carla Bagnoli is Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Modena & Reggio Emilia. She specializes in the theory of rational agency and practical rationality, meta-ethics, with a particular interest in issues of normativity, and the role of emotions in practical reasoning and agency. Recently, she has held visiting posts at the universities of Paris Panthéon-Sorbonne, ENS Lyon, Oslo, and Oxford. Her articles appear in: Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Synthese, Theoria, Philosophia, and Canadian JP. She edited Morality and the Emotions (Oxford UP 2011), and Constructivism in Ethics (Cambridge UP 2013). Her most recent monograph in Italian concerns responsibility, and she is finishing a short monograph on constructivism (Cambridge UP).