Category: Perspectives on Science seminar

At the next Perspectives on Science seminar on Monday 4.10., Lucie White (Leibniz University Hannover) will give a presentation titled “Is Vaccine Refusal Free Riding?”. The seminar takes place in Zoom from 14:15 to 15:45.

Perspectives on Science is a weekly research seminar which brings together experts from science studies and philosophy of science. It is organized by TINT – Centre for Philosophy of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. More information about the seminar here.

To join the seminar, please sign up here.

Abstract:

How we should deal with the problem of COVID-19 vaccine refusal is contingent on whether vaccine refusal is a “free rider” problem. Based on a recent article suggesting that vaccine refusers should not be regarded as classic free riders, I will delve into the connections between vaccine refusal and free riding. I will suggest that vaccine refusers are like free riders in one important sense – they are refusing to contribute to something (herd immunity) that they are benefitting from. But vaccine refusers are arguably not like free riders in that they do not agree that COVID-19 herd immunity is a public good, and that their being vaccinated would be a reasonable contribution towards this good. It might thus be difficult to incentivize vaccination in the way that we might try to incentivize classic free riders to contribute to a public good. Taken together, these arguments constitute a tentative case for vaccine mandates. But in order to determine whether, and under what circumstances, vaccine mandates might be appropriate and effective policy, we must also distinguish between “anti-vaxxers” and the “vaccine hesitant”.

Author bio:

Lucie is a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute of Philosophy, Leibniz University Hannover. She’ll be taking up an assistant professorship at the University of Utrecht in November. She mainly focuses on bioethics, broadly conceived, and at the moment, she’s working on a couple of projects related to COVID-19 and public policy.

At the next Perspectives on Science seminar on Monday 27.9., Magdalena Malecka (University of Helsinki) will give a presentation titled “Towards a Critical Philosophy of Science Perspective on the Behavioural Public Policy”. The seminar takes place in Zoom from 13 to 15 pm.

Perspectives on Science is a weekly research seminar which brings together experts from science studies and philosophy of science. It is organized by TINT – Centre for Philosophy of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. More information about the seminar here.

To join the seminar, please sign up here.

Abstract:

During the talk I would like to summarize the main results of my Marie Skłodowska-Curie project which aimed at understanding how the behavioural sciences and policymaking are entangled with each other in the recent shift in public policymaking, called behavioural public policy, or the behavioral turn in policy. I argue that in the existing discussions on behavioural policy it has not been noticed so far that there is a gap between the way in which behavioural science is represented in the practices and discourses of policymaking and the knowledge that it actually provides. In order to expose this gap, I bring insights from the philosophy of science (in particular, from feminist philosophers of science) and from history of behavioural science (in particular, the history of the US behavioural research during the Cold War). I point out that the discourse of the behavioural policy, but also the debates surrounding it, including critical voices, presume a set of claims about the behavioural sciences. There seems to be a shared understanding of what the behavioural sciences offer us knowledge of. It is widely believed that behavioural research reveals irrationality of human behaviour, that it offers ‘descriptive’ and ‘realistic’ views on decision-making, that it uncovers behavioural tendencies and biases which are systematic and robust, and that it identifies cognitive causes of behavioural changes. I challenge this set of widely shared beliefs. After questioning the epistemic presumption underlying behavioural approach to policy, I reflect on what my argument means for the existing discussion. I believe, and hope, that once we have a proper understanding of what we can and cannot know on the basis of behavioural science, then new critical perspectives on the role of behavioural science in policy will open up. I end my talk by speculating about such perspectives and I present new directions I envision for my further research on this topic.

Author bio:

Magdalena Małecka is a Principal Investigator of the three-year research project in philosophy of economics at the University of Helsinki and an Assistant Professor at Aarhus University (Aarhus Institute of Advanced Studies). After defending her PhD at the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw she has undertaken research at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, Stanford University, Columbia University, New School for Social Research, Central European University, and European University Institute in Florence. Magdalena’s research is driven by an attempt to understand how scientific knowledge is interwoven with social, legal and political practices. She has published in the philosophy of the social and behavioural sciences, philosophy of economics, and philosophy of law.

At the next Perspectives on Science seminar on Monday 20.9., David J. Hand (Imperial College London) will give a presentation titled “Seeing through data – rewards and risks in modern data science”. The seminar takes place in Zoom from 2 to 4 pm.

Perspectives on Science is a weekly research seminar which brings together experts from science studies and philosophy of science. It is organized by TINT – Centre for Philosophy of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. More information about the seminar here.

To join the seminar, please sign up here.

Abstract:

Modern data science has the potential to provide technology which will revolutionise the human condition, but all advanced technologies come with risks, and data technologies are no exception. I examine the potential and risks, looking at the challenges of new sources of data and new data analytic tools, and how to overcome these challenges. Contrary to popular opinion, the increasing use of very large data sets and machine learning and artificial intelligence algorithms means that it is more important than ever to think carefully about problems and how to solve them.

Author bio:

David J. Hand is Emeritus Professor of Mathematics and a Senior Research Investigator at Imperial College, London, where he previously chaired the Statistics Section. He is a Fellow of the British Academy and a former President of the Royal Statistical Society. He has received the Guy Medal of the Royal Statistical Society, the Box Medal from the European Network for Business and Industrial Statistics, and the International Research Medal of the IFCS. His books include Principles of Data Mining, Measurement Theory and Practice, The Improbability Principle, The Wellbeing of Nations, and Dark Data: Why What You Don’t Know Matters.

At the next Perspectives on Science seminar on Monday 13.9., Nils Köbis (Max Planck Institute for Human Development | Center for Humans & Machines) will give a presentation titled “How AI influences human ethical behavior”. The seminar takes place in Zoom from 2 to 4 pm.

Perspectives on Science is a weekly research seminar which brings together experts from science studies and philosophy of science. It is organized by TINT – Centre for Philosophy of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. More information about the seminar here.

To join the seminar, please sign up here.

Abstract:

As machines powered by artificial intelligence (AI) influence humans’ behaviour in ways that are both like and unlike the ways humans influence each other, worry emerges about the corrupting power of AI agents. To estimate the empirical validity of these fears, we review the available evidence from behavioural science, human–computer interaction and AI research. We propose four main social roles through which both humans and machines can influence ethical behaviour. These are: role model, advisor, partner and delegate. When AI agents become influencers (role models or advisors), their corrupting power may not exceed the corrupting power of humans (yet). However, AI agents acting as enablers of unethical behaviour (partners or delegates) have many characteristics that may let people reap unethical benefits while feeling good about themselves, a potentially perilous interaction. On the basis of these insights, we outline a research agenda to gain behavioural insights for better AI oversight.

Author bio:

Nils Köbis is a research scientist at the Center for Humans and Machines, Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin. In his work, he uses behavioral science methods to study corruption, (un-)ethical behavior, social norms, and, more recently, artificial intelligence. He is the co-founder of the Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Network and, together with Matthew Stephenson (Harvard Law School) and Christopher Starke (University of Amsterdam), co-hosts KickBack – The Global AntiCorruption Podcast.

At the next Perspectives on Science seminar on Monday 6.9., Carlo Martini (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University) will give a presentation titled “An empirical, hands-on approach to the demarcation problem: studying science disinformation with experiments”. The seminar takes place in Zoom from 2 to 4 pm.

Perspectives on Science is a weekly research seminar which brings together experts from science studies and philosophy of science. It is organized by TINT – Centre for Philosophy of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. More information about the seminar here.

To join the seminar, please sign up here.

Abstract:

The problem of demarcation has long been treated as a theoretical problem related to the logic or methodology of science. In this presentation I argue that the problem of demarcation ought to be treated as an empirical and practical issue relating to science and its methods of seeking the truth. With that move, we can connect very tightly the problem of demarcation with the problem of scientific disinformation. The second part of the presentation will focus on disinformation and how to tackle it in ecological contexts. Several types of interventions have been proposed to prevent the proliferation of false information online, where most of the spreading takes place. A recently proposed but not yet tested strategy to help online users recognise false content is to follow the techniques of professional fact checkers, such as looking for information on other websites (lateral reading) and looking beyond the first results suggested by search engines (click restraint).

In two preregistered online experiments (N = 5387), we simulated a social-media environment and set-out two interventions, one in the form of a pop-up meant to induce participants to follow such techniques, the other based on monetary incentive. In Experiment 1, we compared these interventions to a control condition. In Experiment 2 another condition was added to test the joint impact of the pop-up and the monetary incentive. We measured participants’ ability to identify whether presented scientific information was scientifically (in)valid.

Results revealed that while monetary incentives were overall more effective in increasing accuracy, the pop-up also contributed when the post originated from an unknown source (and participants could rely less on prior information). Additional analysis on participants’ search style based on both self-report responses and objectively measured behaviour revealed that the pop-up increased the use of fact-checking strategies, and that these in turn increased accuracy. Study 2 also clarified that the pop-up and the incentive did not interfere with each other, but rather acted complementarily, suggesting that attention and literacy interventions can be designed in synergy.

Author bio:

Carlo Martini is Associate Professor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Philosophy at Vita-Salute San Raffaele University (UniSR). His primary research interests are in philosophy of the social sciences and social epistemology. He works on the role of expertise in knowledge transfer from science to policy, on scientific disinformation and public trust in scientific experts. After completing his Ph.D. in Philosophy and Economics at the Tilburg Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, he held various positions at the University of Bayreuth and the University of Helsinki. While at the University of Helsinki, he was awarded a Finnish Cultural Academy grant to study the transfer of knowledge from science to policy makers, through expertise and argumentation. He is currently leader of the work package Behavioral Tools for Building Trust in the H2020 Project Peritia (Policy Expertise and Trust), and work package leader in the project From Models to Decisions, funded with a PRIN grant by the Italian Ministry for University, Education and Research (MIUR).

At the next Perspectives on Science seminar on Monday 7.6., Erik Angner (Stockholm University) will give a presentation titled “Nudging and the Problem of Knowledge”. The seminar takes place in Zoom from 2 to 4 pm.

Perspectives on Science is a weekly research seminar which brings together experts from science studies and philosophy of science. It is organized by TINT – Centre for Philosophy of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. More information about the seminar here.

To join the seminar, please sign up here.

Abstract:

One common argument against nudging and other behavioral interventions goes like this: (1) The amount of information relevant to developing successful nudges is vast. (2) If we had access to all that information, we would be able to develop successful nudges. (3) But we don’t have access to all that information. So (4) we cannot develop successful nudges. The fundamental problem is often referred to as “the knowledge problem.” The general argument form has a venerable history, reminiscent of figures like F. A. Hayek and Adam Smith. Constructed in this way, however, the argument seems obviously misconceived: it is straightforwardly interpreted as an instance of denying the antecedent – a fallacious argument form. The purpose of this paper is to explore various ways of articulating the argument in more compelling ways, and also to assess it. In all, I find, the knowledge problem is best understood as a practical problem for choice architects and behavioral-interventions teams – not as an insurmountable obstacle.

Author bio:

Erik Angner is Professor of Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University. As a result of serious mission creep, he holds two PhDs – one in Economics and one in History and Philosophy of Science – both from the University of Pittsburgh. He is the author of two books, Hayek and Natural Law and A Course in Behavioral Economics (3rd ed., 2021), as well as multiple journal articles and book chapters on behavioral and experimental economics; the economics of happiness; and the history, philosophy, and methodology of contemporary economics.

At the next Perspectives on Science seminar on Monday 24.5., Bruno Verbeek (Leiden University) will give a presentation titled “Instrumentalism vs. Isolationism, on the appropriateness of special principles of taxation”. The seminar is organised as a joint seminar with the Moral & Political Philosophy Research Seminar series. The seminar takes place in Zoom from 2 to 4 pm.

Perspectives on Science is a weekly research seminar which brings together experts from science studies and philosophy of science. It is organized by TINT – Centre for Philosophy of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. More information about the seminar here.

To join the seminar, please sign up here.

Abstract:

Is there justice in taxation?

When reading contemporary theories of distributive justice one easily gets the impression that institutional design is merely instrumentally relevant for the implementation of the favored conception of justice. This is especially the case when thinking about the tax regime. For example, Liam Murphy and Tom Nagel in The Myth of Ownership argue that the moral evaluation of a tax regime boils down to assessing whether it is effective and efficient in realizing the preferred overall pattern of distribution. As a result, they claim that there are no special, domain-specific, normative principles for taxation.

In this paper, I discuss four arguments for this negative conclusion and show that these are inconclusive. I also suggest some reasons to believe that the question whether the tax system is just is not exhausted by determining its contribution to a just distribution of burdens and benefits.

Author bio:

Bruno Verbeek is university lecturer at the Institute of Philosophy at Leiden University (Netherlands) since 2003. In 2012 he founded the Centre for Political Philosophy and currently serves as its director. He has published on game-theoretic analyses of social norms, as well as on rational choice accounts of commitment. Currently, he is working on the idea of authority. In addition he has a strong interest in matters of applied economic distributive justice, especially, in the area of taxation.

At the next Perspectives on Science seminar on Monday 17.5., Carla Bagnoli (University of Modena & Reggio Emilia) will give a presentation titled “The Objective Stance and the Boundary Problem”. The seminar is organised as a joint seminar with the Moral & Political Philosophy Research Seminar series. The seminar takes place in Zoom from 2 to 4 pm.

Perspectives on Science is a weekly research seminar which brings together experts from science studies and philosophy of science. It is organized by TINT – Centre for Philosophy of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. More information about the seminar here.

To join the seminar, please sign up here.

Abstract:

This paper investigates some unexplored ambivalences of Strawson’s distinction between the participant stance marked by reactive attitudes, and the objective stance in which such attitudes are deemed inappropriate. First, it is introduced a distinction between recipient-oriented and agent-oriented reasons for taking the objective stance, which are both practical reasons rooted in the agent’s position. The former category of reasons refers to the recipient’s capacities for moral agency, and the latter to the agent’s interests and concerns. Second, it is shown that taking the objective stance for recipient-oriented reasons (i) is a moral move, which alters one’s normative relation to others; and (ii) it may have severe disempowering effects on others. Third, departing from current debates, this investigation refocuses on cases in which the objective stance is grounded on self-defensive or adversarial reasons. The examination of such cases shows that the objective/participant divide stands behind and organizes the complex dynamics through which moral membership is negotiated. Once agent-oriented reasons are brought into focus, it appears that the divide is contestable and renegotiable: the boundaries of the relevant community can be altered by claiming and reclaiming responsibility. Correspondingly, reactive attitudes should be acknowledged as means and drives of the struggle for moral and political recognition. 

Author bio:

Carla Bagnoli is Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Modena & Reggio Emilia. She specializes in the theory of rational agency and practical rationality, meta-ethics, with a particular interest in issues of normativity, and the role of emotions in practical reasoning and agency. Recently, she has held visiting posts at the universities of Paris Panthéon-Sorbonne, ENS Lyon, Oslo, and Oxford. Her articles appear in: Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Synthese, Theoria, Philosophia, and Canadian JP. She edited Morality and the Emotions (Oxford UP 2011), and Constructivism in Ethics (Cambridge UP 2013). Her most recent monograph in Italian concerns responsibility, and she is finishing a short monograph on constructivism (Cambridge UP).

At the next Perspectives on Science seminar on Monday 10.5., Samuli Reijula (University of Helsinki) will give a presentation titled “Social categories in the making – construction or recruitment?”. The seminar takes place in Zoom from 2 to 4 pm.

Perspectives on Science is a weekly research seminar which brings together experts from science studies and philosophy of science. It is organized by TINT – Centre for Philosophy of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. More information about the seminar here.

To receive the Zoom invitation, please sign up here.

Abstract:

Real kinds, both natural and social categories, are characterized by rich inductive potential. They have relatively stable sets of conceptually independent projectable properties. Somewhat surprisingly, even some purely social categories (e.g., ethnicity, gender, political orientation) show such multiple projectability. The article explores the origin of the inductive richness of social categories and concepts. I argue that existing philosophical accounts provide only a partial explanation, and mechanisms of boundary formation and stabilization must be brought into view for a more comprehensive account of inductively rich social categories.

Author bio:

Samuli Reijula is an Academy of Finland research fellow (2020-2025) and a university lecturer in theoretical philosophy at the University of Helsinki. More about him at www.samulireijula.net.

At the next Perspectives on Science seminar on Monday 3.5., Cléo Chassonnery-Zaïgouche (University of Cambridge) will give a presentation titled “Economists and Policy Networks”. The seminar takes place in Zoom from 2 to 4 pm.

Perspectives on Science is a weekly research seminar which brings together experts from science studies and philosophy of science. It is organized by TINT – Centre for Philosophy of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. More information about the seminar here.

To receive the Zoom invitation, please sign up here.

Abstract:

The main topic of the presentation is the influence of economists and economics on policy. While both economics and policy are moving targets, it is hoped that systematic empirical studies of failures and successes to influence can provide elements for a history of relevance. I will first provide a brief overview of the literature on economists and policy in relation to the more recent literature on expertise in general. I will then discuss the concept of policy network, contextualise its uses in political sciences since the 1970’s and its usefulness for the study of three particular episodes: 1) the role of British economists in the Royal Commission on Equal Pay in 1944-46; 2) the role of Phyllis Wallace at the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in 1965-68; and 3) the role of economists in the U.S. comparable worth controversy in the 1980’s. The last part of the presentation will be exploratory. Using ongoing research on the rise of agglomeration economics in the UK policy landscape, I want to delineate if, why, and when a conceptual framework can be a useful tool to research, describe and theorise in the history of economics.

Author bio:

​​Cléo Chassonnery-Zaïgouche is a historian of economics, currently a postdoctoral research associate on the project Expertise Under Pressure. She works mainly on work on the history of discrimination and wages, economic expertise and quantification. More about her at https://cleocz.com/.

At the next Perspectives on Science seminar on Monday 26.4., Sacha Altay (École Normale Supérieure in Paris) will give a presentation titled “Understanding the spread of fake news”. The seminar takes place in Zoom from 2 to 4 pm.

Perspectives on Science is a weekly research seminar which brings together experts from science studies and philosophy of science. It is organized by TINT – Centre for Philosophy of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. More information about the seminar here.

To receive the Zoom invitation, please sign up here.

Abstract:

In spite of the attractiveness of fake news stories, most people are reluctant to share them. Why? In four pre-registered experiments we found that sharing fake news hurt one’s reputation in a way that is difficult to fix, even for politically congruent fake news. However, some fake news stories did reach a wide cultural success. Does it mean that people don’t care about accuracy and were fooled? Not necessarily. In another paper we identified a factor that, alongside accuracy, drives the sharing of true and fake news: the ‘interestingness-if-true’ of a piece of news. In three pre-registered experiments (N = 904) participants were presented with a series of true and fake news and asked to rate the accuracy of the news how interesting the news would be if it were true and how likely they would be to share it. Participants were more willing to share news they found more interesting-if-true as well as news they deemed more accurate. In the end we argue that people may not share news of questionable accuracy by mistake but instead because the news has qualities that compensate for its potential inaccuracy such as being interesting-if-true.

Author bio:

Sacha Altay is completing a PhD in experimental psychology at the École Normale Supérieure in Paris. Fascinated by (apparently) irrational beliefs, he tries to understand why despite people’s cognitive abilities to resist misinformation, some false beliefs are so widespread. During his PhD Sacha also tested novel communication techniques to correct people’s misperceptions and fight misinformation. He will soon start a postdoctoral position on misinformation and (mis)trust at the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism.

At the next Perspectives on Science seminar on Monday 19.4., Salla-Maaria Laaksonen (University of Helsinki) will give a presentation titled “Unconventional communicators in the corona crisis”. The seminar takes place in Zoom from 2 to 4 pm.

Perspectives on Science is a weekly research seminar which brings together experts from science studies and philosophy of science. It is organized by TINT – Centre for Philosophy of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. More information about the seminar here.

To receive the Zoom invitation, please sign up here.

Abstract:

This talk introduces an ongoing research project UnCoCo that investigates how information and stories related to Covid-19 pandemic circulate and are framed in networks of alternative communicators. Thus we are not interested in the communication by government or traditional media, but rather examine how communicators such as social media influencers or anonymous users take part in framing the pandemic. We conceptualize their discourse as legitimacy judgements targeted towards the institutions and communication of official actors such as the Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare (THL).

This presentation focuses on two groups of alternative communicators: networks of alternative experts that emerged and organized online during spring 2020 and an anonymous group of accounts that perform a parody of THL and its key employees on Twitter using the vernacular modalities of online communication.

A published paper of the first case is available here, open access:
https://jcom.sissa.it/archive/19/05/JCOM_1905_2020_A10

More details about the project:
https://blogs.helsinki.fi/uncocoproject/

Author bio:

Salla-Maaria Laaksonen, Docent, D.Soc.Sc., is a Postdoctoral Researcher
in the Centre for Consumer Society Research, University of Helsinki. Her research areas are technology, organizations, and new media, including organizational reputation and legitimacy in the hybrid media system, the organization of online social movements, and the use of data and algorithms in organizations. She is also an expert in digital and computational research methods. @jahapaula

At the next Perspectives on Science seminar on Monday 12.4., Inkeri Koskinen (Tampere University) will give a presentation titled “Participation and Objectivity”. The seminar takes place in Zoom from 2 to 4 pm.

Perspectives on Science is a weekly research seminar which brings together experts from science studies and philosophy of science. It is organized by TINT – Centre for Philosophy of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. More information about the seminar here.

To receive the Zoom invitation, please sign up here.

Abstract:

Many philosophers of science have recently argued that extra-academic participation in scientific knowledge production does not threaten scientific objectivity. Quite the contrary: citizen science, participatory projects, transdisciplinary research, and other similar endeavours can even increase the objectivity of the conducted research. Simultaneously, scientists working in fields where such participation is common, have expressed worries about various ways in which it can result in biases. In this paper I clarify how participation can both increase and threaten the objectivity of the conducted research.

Author bio:

Inkeri Koskinen is a Senior Research Fellow at Tampere University and is affiliated with TINT. Her topics of interest are objectivity, diversity in science, values in science, democratisation of scientific knowledge production, transdisciplinarity and the philosophy of the humanities.

At the next Perspectives on Science seminar on Monday 29.3., Harold Kincaid (University of Cape Town) will give a presentation titled “Making Progress on Causal Inference in Economics”. The seminar takes place in Zoom from 2 to 4 pm, Helsinki time (UTC+3).

Please notice that Finland will switch to summer time. The time zone is different from previous seminars.

Perspectives on Science is a weekly research seminar which brings together experts from science studies and philosophy of science. It is organized by TINT – Centre for Philosophy of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. More information about the seminar here.

To receive the Zoom invitation, please sign up here.

Abstract:

Enormous progress has been made on causal inference and modeling in areas outside of economics. We now have a full semantics for causality in a number of empirically relevant situations. This semantics is provided by causal graphs and allows provable precise formulation of causal relations and testable deductions from them. The semantics also allows provable rules for sufficient and biasing covariate adjustment and algorithms for deducing causal structure from data. I outline these developments, show how they describe three basic kinds of causal inference situations that standard multiple regression practice in econometrics frequently gets wrong, and show how these errors can be remedied. I also show that instrumental variables, despite claims to the contrary, do not solve these potential errors and are subject to the same morals. I argue both from the logic of elemental causal situations and from simulated data with nice statistical properties and known causal models. I apply these general points to a reanalysis of the Sachs and Warner model and data on resource abundance and growth. I finish with open potentially fruitful questions.

Author bio:

Harold Kincaid is Professor of Economics at the University of Cape Town. Early books were Philosophical Foundations of the Social Sciences (Cambridge 1996) and Individualism and the Unity of Science (Rowman and Littlefield 1997). He is the coeditor of many books, including the OUP Handbooks of Philosophy of Economics, of Social Science and of Political Science (forthcoming) and of the forthcoming A Modern Guide to Philosophy of Economics (Elgar). He is the author of numerous journal articles and book chapters in the philosophy of science and social science. In addition to his philosophy of science work, Kincaid does work in experimental economics focusing primarily on risk and time attitude elicitation, currently in the context of covid.

At the next Perspectives on Science seminar on Monday 22.3., Uskali Mäki (University of Helsinki) will give a presentation titled “Modelling and functions: within and without”. The seminar takes place in Zoom from 2 to 4 pm.

Perspectives on Science is a weekly research seminar which brings together experts from science studies and philosophy of science. It is organized by TINT – Centre for Philosophy of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. More information about the seminar here.

To receive the Zoom invitation, please sign up here.

Abstract:

As a cognitive activity, modelling can serve a variety of external functions, such as explanation, prediction, exploration, education, design, persuasion, and so on; and each of these comes in numerous possible further variants. The components of modelling, including idealizing assumptions, serve numerous functions within the activity, such as isolating causal mechanisms and securing mathematical tractability. The challenge of decomposition and coordination is to identify these functions and align them with one another; meeting this challenge is the burden of model commentary. All this has consequences for issues such as model evaluation and the sensible locus of truth ascription in modelling. The talk will summarize, expand, and refine my own past work, and will respond to some recent contributions by other philosophers of modelling.

For background reading, see Mäki (2020).

Author bio:

Uskali Mäki is professor emeritus at the University of Helsinki, directing TINT – Centre for Philosophy of Social Science; and a visiting professor at Nankai University, China. Between 2006-2017 he was an Academy professor. In 1995-2006 he was professor of theoretical philosophy at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam in the Netherlands, directing EIPE [Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics]. He is a former editor of the Journal of Economic Methodology (1995-2005). His current research focuses mainly on the philosophy of economics and on models, scientific realism, interdisciplinarity, and social aspects of science.

At the next Perspectives on Science seminar on Monday 15.3., Judith Favereau (Université Lyon 2) will give a presentation titled “Trapped in paternalism: randomized experiments and poverty”. The seminar takes place in Zoom from 2 to 4 pm.

Perspectives on Science is a weekly research seminar which brings together experts from science studies and philosophy of science. It is organized by TINT – Centre for Philosophy of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. More information about the seminar here.

To receive the Zoom invitation, please sign up here.

Abstract:

Esther Duflo and Abhijit Banerjee within the J-PAL, promote the systematic use of randomized field experiments (RFEs) in order to fight poverty. Thus, RFEs tend to shape the policies that can be tested with such an experimental design. These policies are behaviorally oriented, therefore many of them are actually nudging devices. Furthermore, Duflo strengthens the J-PAL’s perspective from libertarian paternalism (e.g. nudges) to what she calls a “democratic paternalism”. My claim in this paper is that J-PAL’s RFEs in failing to access the mechanisms behind the poor behaviors, makes it difficult for J-PAL’s researchers to draw political recommendations, and as such Duflo is smoothly pushed to call for a stronger paternalism. The paper methodologically explains such a shift and highlights potential political and methodological alternatives to randomized field experiments.

Author bio:

Judith Favereau is currently an associate professor in philosophy of economics and history of economic thought at the pluridisciplinary laboratory TRIANGLE in the University Lyon 2. She is also affiliated to TINT – Centre for Philosophy of Social Science. Her topics of interest are: development economics, experimental economics, philosophy of economics and evidence-based policy. Her research focuses on how development economics, experimental economics and evidence-based policy interact together in order to fight poverty, which implies studying the methodology of these sub-fields and their disciplinary transfers. More information about her at her website judithfavereau.wordpress.com.

At the next Perspectives on Science seminar on Tuesday 9.3., Jack Vromen (Erasmus University Rotterdam) will give a presentation titled “Just how unobjectionable is the Pareto principle?”. The seminar takes place in Zoom from 3 to 5 pm.

Perspectives on Science is a weekly research seminar which brings together experts from science studies and philosophy of science. It is organized by TINT – Centre for Philosophy of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. More information about the seminar here.

To receive the Zoom invitation, please sign up here.

Abstract:

The Pareto principle (roughly, the principle that social state B is to be preferred to A if some are better off in B than in A and no one is worse off in B than in A) seems to be generally and routinely accepted by economists without further justification. Economists grant that the principle is weak, in the sense that it applies to only a small subset of comparisons of social states, but almost never seem to call its acceptability in question. Indeed, some economists even state that they cannot see how anyone could possibly object to the Pareto principle. In the paper I argue that reasonable objections, related for example to distributional concerns, can be made to the principle. I first note that that the principle is treacherously simple: it can (and has actually been) interpreted, used and applied in various ways. I then point out that if we confine our attention to how welfare economists standardly interpret and use the principle, the principle can do justice to distributional concerns. Yet I also argue that there are limits to this. Strictly speaking, the Pareto principle implies that no external (“extra-welfarist”) concern can possibly override social welfare changes (as defined by the principle), no matter how weighty the external concern and how small the welfare changes. In principle, such extreme implications can be avoided by generalizing the Pareto principle. But the price to be paid for such a generalization is that the principle becomes even weaker in the sense that it applies to an even smaller set of comparisons of social states.

Author bio:

Jack Vromen is professor of philosophy at the Erasmus School of Philosophy and Director of the Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics (EIPE, both at Erasmus University Rotterdam). He co-edits with N. Emrah Aydinonat the Journal of Economic Methodology. His research is at the intersection of economics and philosophy, with special attention to foundations of evolutionary economics, new institutional economics and neuroeconomics. More recently his research focuses on social preferences, on what they are, how they could have evolved, what might motivate them and whether their satisfaction should be included in welfare evaluations.

At the next Perspectives on Science seminar on Monday 1.3., Kristina Rolin (Tampere University) will give a presentation titled “Trust in Science: The Moral Dimension”. The seminar takes place in Zoom from 2 to 4 pm.

Perspectives on Science is a weekly research seminar which brings together experts from science studies and philosophy of science. It is organized by TINT, the Centre for Philosophy of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. More information about the seminar here.

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Abstract:

Trust in alleged experts is thought to be rational when the experts are trustworthy, and one has good reasons to believe that they are trustworthy, and one trusts the experts because of these reasons. Trustworthiness is thought to have two dimensions: the epistemic and the moral. Whereas the epistemic dimension involves expertise (to a reasonable degree in a relevant domain), the moral dimension involves honesty and good will towards those who are epistemically dependent on the expert. Trustworthiness is rarely transparent to others, and hence, the assessment of trustworthiness is dependent on the social indicators of trustworthiness (e.g., indicators of expertise, honesty, good will, and capability to make sound moral judgments). While there is a fair amount of discussion about the social indicators of expertise (Anderson 2011; Goldman 2006), there is surprisingly little discussion about the social indicators of the moral dimension of trustworthiness. In my presentation, I focus on the moral dimension of trustworthiness and its social indicators. In the first part of my presentation, I explain why Baier’s (1986) moral conception of trust (rather than mere reliance) is appropriate in an analysis of trust in science. In the second part of my presentation, I argue that to understand the social indicators of the moral dimension of trustworthiness, we need to distinguish between two types of cases, the ones in which honesty and good will can be assumed by default and the ones in which they cannot be assumed by default. Finally, I analyze the social indicators of the moral dimension in the latter case.

Author bio:

Kristina Rolin is University Lecturer in Research Ethics at Tampere University. She is the PI of the research project “Social and Cognitive Diversity in Science: An Epistemic Assessment” (2018-2022). Her areas of research are philosophy of science and social science, social epistemology, and feminist epistemology and philosophy of science. She is interested in diversity in science, the role of trust and values in science, collective knowledge, epistemic responsibility, and objectivity.

At the next Perspectives on Science seminar on Monday 22.2., Antti Kauppinen (University of Helsinki) will give a presentation titled “How Not to Make Trade-Offs Between Health and Other Goods”. The seminar is organised as a joint seminar with the Moral & Political Philosophy Research Seminar series. The seminar takes place in Zoom from 2 to 4 pm.

Perspectives on Science is a weekly research seminar which brings together experts from science studies and philosophy of science. It is organized by TINT, the Centre for Philosophy of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. More information about the seminar here.

To join the seminar, please sign up here.

Abstract:

In the context of a global pandemic, there is good health-based reason for governments to impose various social distancing measures. However, in addition to health benefits, such measures also cause economic and other harms. In this paper, I look at proposals to make use of existing QALY (quality-adjusted life year) valuations and WELLBYs (wellbeing-adjusted life-years) as the currency for making trade-offs between health and other goods. I argue that both methods are problematic. First, whether the costs and benefits are translated into money or well-being, the result is that morally irrelevant utilities are weighed against morally relevant ones. Second, neither of these approaches can capture the fundamental moral asymmetry between doing and allowing harm, since they construe trade-offs in terms of outcomes while ignoring information about the role of various agents in the causal chains that bring them about. I conclude that deliberation about trade-offs should remain a messy and communal process that can’t be replaced with well-intentioned calculation.

Author bio:

Antti Kauppinen is a Professor of Practical Philosophy at the University of Helsinki and PI of the Academy of Finland Research Project Responsible Beliefs: Why Ethics and Epistemology Need Each Other ​(2019-2023).  He works mostly on ethics and metaethics, on topics like normativity, meaning in life, well-being, and moral sentiments. He also like to teach political philosophy. More information about him can be found here.