In next week’s Perspectives on Science Seminar, we will have a talk by Aki Lehtinen (TINT/University of Helsinki) titled “Explaining with False Models that Entail False Result”. The talk is based on his paper together with Emrah Aydinonat.
The seminar will take place in Metsätalo (room 10) from 14:15 to 15:45 on Monday, October 12, 2026.
Perspectives on Science is a research seminar that brings together experts from the philosophy of science and several fields of science studies. It is organized by TINT – Centre for Philosophy of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. More information about the seminar can be found on the TINT webpage https://tint.helsinki.fi.
What: “Explaining with False Models that Entail False Result” by Aki Lehtinen
When: Monday 12.10.2026, from 2 to 4 pm (EEST, Helsinki time).
Where: Metsätalo (room 10) and Zoom.
Zoom link: Contact mirja-leena.zgurskaya@helsinki.fi for the Zoom link.
Abstract:
“Explaining with False Models that Entail False Result” by Aki Lehtinen and Emrah Aydinonat.
Scientific models often explain despite containing idealisations, abstractions, and other falsehoods. Most philosophical accounts of such explanation nevertheless presuppose that the model result corresponds to a phenomenon that actually obtains in the target. This paper addresses a different class of cases: false models that entail false results (FMEFs). Examples include the Modigliani-Miller theorem, Akerlof’s lemons model, McKelvey’s chaos theorem, and the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. In such cases, the literal model result is false of the systems to which the model is applied, yet the model remains scientifically central and explanatorily informative.
We argue that FMEFs can support fully factive explanations. The model itself need not constitute the explanation. Rather, together with relevant background information, it can support the construction of an explanatory argument whose commitments are true. Our account develops Hindriks’s idea of explanation by relaxation, but extends it beyond cases in which explanation proceeds by de-idealising or de-abstracting a single model. Distinct models may instead represent independent mechanisms whose effects counteract one another.
This account also bears on arguments for non-factivism about model-based explanation and understanding. The persistence of idealisations even when more realistic alternatives are available does not by itself show that explanation is non-factive: a false benchmark may be retained because its falsity helps isolate a mechanism and fix an explanatory contrast. Nor does the fact that explanatorily relevant features are themselves often represented idealistically force a move to non-factive explanation. Result-generating assumptions may be literally or quantitatively false while still preserving the existence and qualitative operation of a real mechanism. Factivity therefore need not require literal truth of every explanatorily relevant model assumption.
We distinguish the falsity involved in distorting omissions from the idealisation of result-generating assumptions, and show how factivity is secured differently in the two cases. The resulting picture explains why false models with false results can remain explanatorily useful, why their idealisations may rationally persist, and how they can provide understanding before the complete explanation of their own failure has been established.
Bio:
Aki Lehtinen is a philosopher of science and economics whose research focuses on scientific modelling, explanation, idealisation, and robustness. He has held professorial and research positions in Finland and China and has published extensively on the methodology and epistemology of economic models.
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If you have any questions about the seminar, do not hesitate to contact mirja-leena.zgurskaya@helsinki.fi.