Dear All,
In our next week’s Perspectives on Science Seminar, Panu Raatikainen (University of Tampere) will give a talk titled “Consciousness, Materialism, and Explanation”.
The seminar will take place in Metsätalo room 10, and online on Zoom from 14:15 to 15:45 on Monday, March 30, 2026.
Perspectives on Science is a research seminar that brings together experts from the philosophy of science and several fields of science studies. It is organized by TINT – Centre for Philosophy of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. More information about the seminar can be found on the TINT webpage https://tint.helsinki.fi.
What: “Consciousness, Materialism, and Explanation” by Panu Raatikainen
When: Monday 30.03.2026, from 2 to 4 pm (EEST, Helsinki time).
Where: Metsätalo room 10 and Zoom.
Zoom link: Contact mirja-leena.zgurskaya@helsinki.fi for the Zoom link.
Abstract:
“Consciousness, Materialism, and Explanation”
In recent decades, phenomenal consciousness has been a central topic in philosophy. It is often regarded as a challenge to materialism. David Chalmers, for instance, has famously used it in his attempt to refute materialism in favor of a form of property dualism. Following his lead, it has become customary to speak of “the hard problem of consciousness.” Chalmers’s arguments are frequently presented in conjunction with his sophisticated and controversial two‑dimensional semantic framework. However, beneath this technical apparatus lies a more fundamental line of thought that is arguably independent of such technicalities. In particular, both Type‑A materialists and Chalmers (and others of similar persuasion) share the following background assumption (where “physical” means strictly physical, i.e., expressible in the language of microphysics):
(SA) If a certain higher‑level fact supervenes on narrowly physical facts with metaphysical necessity, then that higher‑level fact can, in principle, be deduced a priori from the subvening physical facts.
Moreover, even many Type‑B materialists—who reject (SA)—nevertheless agree with the following:
(BI) If some higher‑level facts, or the bridge laws connecting them to more fundamental facts, cannot be deduced a priori from those more fundamental facts (here: microphysical facts), then they are “brute facts” and “inexplicable.”
These assumptions have dominated recent debates about consciousness. In this talk, I contrast them with an alternative perspective informed by contemporary philosophy of science. I argue that the above theses rely on a strong, somewhat outdated, and problematic conception of explanation and reduction. I also evaluate them at a more concrete level through selected examples from, for instance, the philosophy of chemistry and mechanistic explanations in the biological sciences. I conclude with some remarks on the status of materialism as a working hypothesis.
Bio:
Panu Raatikainen is a Professor of Philosophy and the Head of the Field of Study at Tampere University, Finland. He received his doctorate in Theoretical Philosophy from the University of Helsinki in 1998. Raatikainen has worked as an Academy Research Fellow of the Academy of Finland and as a Fellow at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies. He has also been a visiting research fellow at the Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London; at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York (CUNY); and an Affiliated Research Scholar with the Saul Kripke Center at the CUNY Graduate Center.
His academic work has ranged from logic, computability, and the philosophy of science to the philosophy of language and mind. Raatikainen’s research output exceeds one hundred publications in journals such as Analysis, Erkenntnis, Synthese, European Journal for Philosophy of Science, and Journal of Symbolic Logic. His current research interests include natural kinds and “the hard problem of consciousness.”
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If you have any questions about the seminar, do not hesitate to contact mirja-leena.zgurskaya@helsinki.fi.